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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Key words: disasters, vulnerability, business, post-disaster recovery, disaster planning  
 
Business plays important roles in community functioning. However, disaster research has 
been disproportionately focusing on units of analysis such as families, households, and 
government agencies. This paper synthesizes the major findings within the business 
development research field and those within the disaster research field. It constructs a 
research framework for evaluating business vulnerability to natural disasters. Our 
theoretical integration of the research conducted to date addresses five major issues. First, 
it defines the ways in which businesses are subject to the impacts of natural disasters. 
Second, it identifies the factors that determine the magnitude of business impacts after a 
disaster. Third, it identifies how and when businesses will return to their pre-disaster 
level in the disaster stricken community. Fourth, it outlines how business impacts interact 
with other aspects of community impacts (i.e. socio-demographic impacts) of natural 
disasters? Fifth, it discusses which business sectors are winners and which are losers in 
response to a natural disaster in terms of how to measure business losses or gains. 
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VULNERABILITY OF COMMUNITY BUSINESSES TO  
ENVIRONMENTAL DISASTERS  
 
 
The research literature on community economic development (e.g., Bergman 
1981; Blakely and Bradshaw, 2002) and business strategic planning (e.g., Porter 1985) 
both recognize that extreme events can have a devastating impact on business viability. In 
both cases, however, their emphasis has been on events—such as economic recessions 
and plant closings—originating in the economic system rather than the natural 
environment. In the disaster literature, research on business impacts has been less 
developed as well, comparing to the extensive literature on community impacts of 
environmental disasters (see Lindell and Prater, 2003, for a review). Despite a 
recognition that businesses play an important socioeconomic role in community 
functioning by providing products/services, employment opportunities, and taxes 
(Cochrane 1992), disaster research has tended to focus on families, households, and 
government agencies (Burby 1998; Tierney, Lindell and Perry, 2001). More research on 
business impacts is needed so communities can better prepare for, respond to, mitigate 
against, and recover from environmental disasters. To achieve these aims, the following 
four questions need to be answered. First, in what ways are businesses affected by 
environmental disasters? Second, what factors determine the magnitude of a disaster’s 
impacts on local businesses? Third, how and when will businesses return to their pre-
disaster levels of production, sales, and profitability? Fourth, what measures can be taken 
by individual firms and community planners to reduce the impacts of environmental 
disasters? 
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PREVIOUS RESEARCH ON ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF DISASTERS 
 
 
Much of the research on economic impacts of environmental disasters has tended to 
be carried out on highly aggregated units of analysis, with national and regional business 
losses being the focal point of most economic research on disaster impacts. Two early 
studies examining aggregate economic indexes across multiple disasters concluded that, 
at most, environmental disasters accelerate existing trends (Friesma, Caporaso, Goldstein, 
Linbery, and McCleary 1979; Wright, Rossi, Wright and Weber-Burdin 1979). More 
recent studies have adopted inter-industry input-output analysis and social accounting 
approaches (Boisvert 1992; Cochrane 1974, 1997; Cole 1995 1997; Gordon and 
Richardson 1996; Kawashima and Kanoh 1990; Rose and Benavides 1997; Rose, 
Benavides, Chang, Szczesnick and Linn 1997; Wilson 1982) or regional econometric 
models (Chang 1983; Ellson, Milliman and Roberts 1984; Guimaraes, Hefner and 
Woodward 1993; West and Lenze 1994). Although these large-scale studies are useful 
for understanding the national and regional impacts of disasters, their level of aggregation 
has obscured the differential impacts of disasters on specific types of businesses within 
the affected communities. Indeed, Kroll, Landis, Shen, and Stryker (1990) showed that 
aggregation level (e.g. city, county, state) strongly affected conclusions about the 
economic impacts of the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake. Thus, microanalytic studies are 
needed to provide guidance for community planners and business owners in developing 
better methods for reducing disaster impacts. 
Consistent with this principle, other studies of the economic impacts of 
environmental disasters have examined the ways in which individual business prepare 
for, are disrupted by, and recover from these events. Dahlhamer and D’Souza (1997), 
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Dahlhamer and Reshaur (1996), Drabek (1991, 1995), Lindell and Perry (1998), Mileti, 
Darlington, Fitzpatrick and O’Brien (1993), Tierney (1997a), Tierney and Dahlhamer 
(1998), and Whitney, Dickerson, and Lindell (2001) have found that disasters disrupt 
businesses through a variety of mechanisms in addition to direct physical damage to 
buildings, equipment, vehicles, and inventories. Specifically, disruption of infrastructure 
such as water/sewer, electric power, fuel (i.e., natural gas), transportation, and 
telecommunications frequently forces businesses to shut down in the aftermath of a 
disaster (Alesch, Taylor, Ghanty and Nagy 1993; Kroll, Landis, Shen and Stryker 1990; 
Tierney 1997b; Tierney and Nigg 1995; Webb, Tierney and Dahlhamer 2000). For 
example, Tierney (1997b) reported extensive lifeline service interruption after the 1993 
Midwest floods caused many business closures in Des Moines, Iowa even though 
physical damage was confined to a small area. Moreover, disasters can cause population 
dislocation, losses in discretionary income among those victims who remain in the impact 
area (which can weaken market demand for many products and services) and competitive 
pressure from large outside businesses. All of these indirect effects cause small 
businesses to experience a high rate of failure in the aftermath of a disaster (Alesch and 
Holly 1996; Alesch, Holly, Mittler and Nagy 2001). Indeed, these factors can produce 
business failures long after the precipitating event, especially if the community was 
already in economic decline (Bates and Peacock 1993; Durkin 1984; Webb, Tierney and 
Dahlhamer 2002), especially those businesses that were marginally profitable before the 
disaster. Small businesses experience more obstacles than large firms and chains in re-
establishing pre-disaster levels of operations. This is because small firms are more likely 
to be located in non-engineered buildings, depend primarily on neighborhood customers, 
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lack the capacity to design and implement hazard management programs, lack the 
financial resources needed for recovery, and lack access to governmental recovery 
programs (Alesch and Holly 1996; Alesch, et al. 2001; Dahlhamer and Tierney 1996, 
1998; Durkin 1984; Kroll et al. 1990).  
There also is variation among business sectors during recovery. Whereas wholesale 
and retail businesses generally report experiencing significant sales losses, manufacturing 
and construction companies often show gains following a disaster (Durkin 1984; Kroll et 
al. 1990; Webb et al. 2000). Moreover, businesses that serve a large (e.g. regional or 
international) market tend to recover more rapidly than those that only serve local 
markets (Webb et al. 2002).  
This research provides useful empirical evidence for understanding business 
impacts of environmental disasters and suggests what measures local businesses can take 
to reduce their hazard vulnerability. It also provides a basis for local government policies 
that will protect the community’s economic base in the event of environmental disasters. 
However, none of this research has articulated a systematic model of the business impacts 
of disasters. Therefore, a systematic model of the business impacts of environmental 
disasters is presented below.  
 
 
A CONCEPTUAL MODEL OF DISASTER IMPACTS ON BUSINESSES 
 
Businesses are entities engaging in commercial activities that involve the 
manipulation and assembly of productive resources to create products and services. 
Figure 1 depicts the process by which businesses use capital and labor to convert 
materials and infrastructure received from suppliers into products and services that are 
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delivered to customers. Capital comprises fixed assets, inventories, and cash, securities, 
and accounts receivable, whereas labor is the contribution of people working with their 
knowledge and skills (Brigham and Houston 2002; Schugart, Benjamin, Francia and 
Strawser 2002). These resources are organized into a value chain that includes 
purchasing, operations, sales/marketing, service, finance/accounting, research and 
development (product and process), supervision, general administration (Thompson and 
Strickland 1996). By selling its products and services to consumers, a business generates 
revenues that are then returned to suppliers to make payments that maintain business 
continuity in a dynamic equilibrium of input and output flows. Conversely, interruption 
of any part of the flow has the potential to jeopardize business viability. 
 
BUSINESS
Capital
Labor
CUSTOMERSSUPPLIERS
Materials and infrastructure Products and services
RevenuesPayments
 
Figure 1: Conceptual model of business operations 
 
 
Government, households, and other businesses all play important roles as suppliers 
and customers for business operations. Government is a supplier of the road network and 
some lifeline facilities (e.g. water/sewer, electric power, and fuel) and is also a consumer 
for some of businesses’ products and services. Furthermore, government can influence 
business development through policies such as taxes, loans, land use, building 
construction, and capital development (Blakely and Bradshaw 2002). Households 
contribute to business operations as the primary suppliers of employees and, at the same 
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time, as the major consumers for most products and services. Finally, inter-business 
linkages are also important; other firms continually supply those portions of 
infrastructure not supplied by government and also distribute or consume products and 
services.  
Of course, businesses vary in the geographic areas they serve; some have dispersed 
markets covering large areas whereas others are supplied by and serve only very local 
markets. A business inside the impact area (Figure 2) might have suppliers either inside 
or outside the disaster impact area. Similarly, its customers might be located totally 
inside, partially inside, or totally outside the impact area. Conversely, a business located 
outside the impact area can be affected through supplier and customer disruptions. 
Indeed, it is possible for a business outside the impact area to be more severely affected 
than one inside the impact area. 
 
Business A
Business B
Customer A
Customer BSupplier B
Supplier A
Supplier D Customer D
Customer C
Impact area Unaffected area
Supplier C
 
Figure 2: Businesses’ relationship to the disaster impact area 
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The model presented in this section makes it possible to enumerate the ways in 
which environmental disasters affect businesses—capital vulnerability, labor 
vulnerability, supplier vulnerability, and customer vulnerability.  
 
Capital vulnerability 
 
As noted earlier, business capital can be classified into three categories according to 
the level of liquidity: fixed assets (e.g. buildings, equipment, furnishings, and vehicles), 
inventories (e.g. raw materials, intermediate products, and finished products), and cash 
and securities (e.g. cash, marketable securities, and accounts receivable). Fixed assets are 
highly vulnerable because they have low mobility and are subject to direct physical 
damage by disasters. For this reason, businesses with large amounts of fixed assets are 
more vulnerable than those with small amounts of fixed assets (Alesch et al. 1993; 
Tierney 1997a; Tierney 1997b). Similarly, businesses with large inventories are highly 
vulnerable because these materials have low mobility and are subject to direct physical 
damage. Cash, securities, and accounts receivable are less vulnerable to environmental 
disasters because they are intangible assets that are processed electronically, so 
information about them can be stored in multiple locations. 
Business vulnerability to environmental disasters also can be affected significantly 
by managers’ decisions about whether to own or lease capital. Leased capital (e.g. leased 
building and equipment, debt) requires businesses to generate revenue more rapidly than 
the interest it pays to creditors. In the aftermath of disaster, businesses with lower 
proportions of leased capital have greater cushions against creditors’ interest payments 
and, thus, face less financial pressure. This is a significant issue because Alesch et al. 
(2001), Tierney (1997b), and Webb et al. (2000) reported many businesses avoided 
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recovery loans from the Small Business Administration (SBA) and commercial banks 
because additional indebtedness would compound their financial burdens. Instead, most 
small businesses rely on personal savings and grants or loans from relatives. 
Business size, measured by the number of employees, is a correlate of a business’s 
ability to cope with environmental disasters (Alesch et al. 2001; Drabek 1991, 1995; 
Durkin 1984; Kroll et al. 1990; Tierney 1997b). Small businesses have encountered many 
more obstacles to recover from disaster effects than large ones, but many factors can 
account for this finding. Large firms are more likely to spread their risk by operating in 
multiple locations. In addition, large businesses are more likely to be located in newer 
disaster-resilient facilities and are more likely to have sufficient staff to employ 
specialists in developing disaster response and recovery (Lindell and Perry 1998; 
Whitney, et al. 2001). Moreover, large businesses are more likely to be able to afford 
hazard insurance, business interruption insurance, or contingency funds for disaster 
recovery. Large businesses also have a significant amount of financial and political 
influence in their communities, which gives them a high priority in governmental 
recovery policies and also substantial influence in getting private contractors to rebuild 
their facilities first. Large firms and multi-branch firms are better positioned in inter-
business and intra-business collaborations on supplying, purchasing, and labor shifting to 
cope with emergencies. Finally, large businesses are likely to have much stronger input 
and output ties that facilitate recovery from disasters. 
 
Labor vulnerability 
 
Environmental disasters can disrupt businesses’ labor inputs by causing significant 
short-term population changes in a disaster-stricken community. Employee casualties 
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(deaths, injuries, and illnesses) will obviously hinder normal business operations because 
employees are either permanently or temporarily unavailable for work. The degree of 
disruption to a business depends upon the ease of employee replacement. All other 
factors being equal, a large labor pool and reliance on less skilled workers makes it easier 
to replace employees that have been displaced by a disaster. Similarly, casualties within 
employees’ families could either reduce their work hours or require extended leaves of 
absence. Moreover, damage to employees’ dwellings might cause victims to relocate 
permanently or to move into temporary housing for a lengthy period of time (Bolin and 
Stanford 1998; Girard and Peacock 1997; Quarantelli 1982). In some cases, permanent 
employee dislocation causes employee turnover because the new housing is so far from 
the workplace that it is infeasible to continue with an employer. However, even 
temporary population dislocation can disrupt business operations many ways. For 
example, victim employees can become so preoccupied restoring their household routines 
that their working hours must be reduced or entirely curtailed for some period of time. 
Such tasks include filing insurance claims, applying for building permits, applying for 
loans or grants, cleaning debris, and repairing structural damage. Moreover, even 
employees that can remain in their homes can be kept from working by disrupted access 
to workplaces. For instance, closure of the Oakland/San Francisco Bay Bridge following 
the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake required a quarter-million commuters to rearrange their 
travel patterns. Many of these were forced to take longer, more costly routes to work. 
Damage also caused closure of the major highway linking Santa Cruz to job centers in 
Santa Clara County, so many people changed from private vehicles to rail or bus services 
(Federal Emergency Management Agency 1999). Kroll, et al. (1990) concluded that 
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damage to transportation networks after the Loma Prieta earthquake caused significant 
economic impacts in San Francisco Bay Area and Santa Cruz area.  
A business’s internal labor organization—defined in terms of the coordination of 
employees’ working times and locations—also affects the magnitude of disaster impacts. 
Businesses with flexible forms of labor organization can return to operation shortly after 
the event, but this response varies by type of business. After the 1989 Loma Prieta 
earthquake, flexible work hours were widely used in FIRE sector (40.6% of affected 
companies) and manufacturing (45.5%), but significantly less in construction firms 
(22.2%) in the Oakland and Santa Cruz areas. However, employees’ work locations are 
less flexible than work hours, so only 10 percent of the companies in the FIRE sector and 
almost none in the manufacturing and construction sectors allowed employees to work at 
home (Kroll et al. 1990). 
 
Supplier vulnerability 
 
Tierney and Nigg (1995) and Tierney (1997b) reported water/sewer, electric power, 
fuel (e.g., natural gas pipelines), telecommunications, and transportation experienced 
varying degrees of interruption after the 1993 Midwest flood and 1994 Northridge 
earthquake and loss of lifeline services was among the main reasons for business closure 
after these disasters. Their research found lifelines vary significantly in the immediacy of 
their disruptive effects, with Nigg’s (1995) study in Memphis and Shelby County 
reporting business owners’ estimates of the amount of time their businesses could 
continue operation after different types of infrastructure loss: 0 hours for electricity, 4 
hours for telephones, 48 hours for water/sewer, and 120 hour for natural gas.  
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Disasters can close suppliers, which can force a business to adjust to materials 
shortage for at least a short time even if it does not experience any physical damages. 
Suppose a neighborhood grocery store depends on a regional distribution center for its 
supplies. If this distribution center suffers severe damage and is forced to shut down, the 
grocery store must either find a new business partner or also suspend operations. This 
“domino” effect on production operations produces an economic multiplier in which 
indirect losses ripple out from the direct losses. Thus, businesses experience direct losses 
when their capital assets are physically damaged and indirect losses when they are 
functionally connected to other businesses that have themselves experienced either direct 
or indirect losses (Committee on Assessing the Costs of Natural Disasters 1999). 
 
Customer vulnerability 
 
For the same reasons as they lose employees, businesses can also lose customers 
during the disaster aftermath either because of population casualties or, more likely, 
short-term population dislocation. In addition, demographic changes in disaster stricken 
communities can destroy the established customer base of local businesses (Girard and 
Peacock 1997; Smith 1996; Smith and McCarty 1996). A long period of regaining new 
customers could be fatal for some firms, especially small ones (Alesch et al. 2001). 
Furthermore, disasters can cause consumer preferences to change and thus influence the 
market demand for some products and services. Following a major disaster that causes 
extensive building damage, victims will tend to decrease their consumption of luxury 
goods and services. For those businesses that provide only these products and services, a 
disaster can cause an immediate drop in sales. 
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This problem is especially difficult for impacted businesses serving only a market 
in the impact area (Alesch and Holly 1996; Alesch et al. 2000; Webb et al. 2000, 2002). 
Businesses of this kind, usually small wholesale and retail firms, face the loss of all their 
sales because of short-term customer losses (e.g. temporary or permanent relocation 
because of housing damage). By contrast, businesses serving regional or international 
markets experience less impact on their sales, a phenomenon that explains why 
manufacturing in the San Francisco Bay Area experienced smaller losses than general 
wholesale and retail businesses after the Loma Prieta earthquake (Kroll et al. 1990). As is 
the case with consumers, inter-business purchasing partnerships are also subject to 
disaster-induced disruption. If a major buyer suffers serious disaster impact and decreases 
its purchases, then the provider business will soon experience decreased sales unless it 
can find alternate customers.   
It is important to recognize that some demand shifts rather than disappears. 
Specifically, households put more of their expenditures into reconstructing their homes 
and replacing damaged furnishings. Consequently, disaster relevant industries such as 
construction, building materials, and home/office furnishings can experience increasing 
demand from disaster stricken communities to meet short-term needs for reconstruction 
of residential, commercial, and industrial structures, and infrastructure (Committee on 
Assessing the Costs of Natural Disasters 1999). In addition, a large influx of construction 
crews into a community also stimulates demand for hotels and restaurants (Alesch et al. 
2001; Webb et al. 2002). One nonobvious consequence of this shift in demand is a 
compensating shift in supply, as when building supply outlets find themselves facing 
competition from large outside wholesalers whose sales volume allows them to sell at 
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lower prices. Furthermore, local demand for construction materials experiences a 
precipitous drop after reconstruction is finished and remains at a depressed level for 
several years before returning to a stable replacement rate for these products. This 
“second wave” disaster continues the pressure on local firms’ sales.   
 
Table 1: Dimensions of business vulnerability 
Vulnerability 
Dimensions Key Factors Operationalization 
Expected 
Direction of 
Effect 
1. Capital mobility 
1. Proportion of fixed 
assets, inventories, 
cash/securities 
- 
2. Capital ownership 2. Proportion of owned capital - 
Capital  
3. Business size 3. Number of employee - 
1. Ease of employee 
replacement 
1. Availability of the 
labor pool - 
Labor  2. Flexibility of labor 
organization 
2. Flexible work hours 
and/or flexible work 
locations 
- 
1. Lifeline infrastructure 
dependence 
1. Operation duration 
without different 
lifeline infrastructure 
+ 
Supplier  
2. Inter-business 
dependence 
2. Operation duration 
without inter-business 
supplies    
+ 
1. Market stability 1. Regional/national/local market coverage - Customer  2. Reconstruction 
relevance 
2. Reconstruction related 
or not - 
 
 
Based upon the above discussions, Table 1 lists these four dimensions of business 
vulnerability, the underlying key factors for each dimension, operationalization of each 
factor, and the expected direction of causal effect of each factor on business vulnerability. 
Regarding the capital dimension of business vulnerability, mobility, ownership, and 
business size are three major determinants. These three factors are expected to have 
negative effects on the level of business vulnerability, which means that business with 
higher capital mobility, higher proportion of owned capital, and bigger size are less 
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vulnerable to disasters. For the labor dimension of business vulnerability, ease of 
employee replacement and flexibility of labor organization are two major determinants. 
Businesses that have larger labor pool to retain their employee level and those who have 
flexible labor organization to accommodate the disruption caused by disaster impacts 
have lower level of vulnerability. The supplier dimension of business vulnerability is 
determined by dependence on lifeline infrastructure and dependence on other businesses. 
The higher level of dependence in both cases will lead to higher level vulnerability. For 
the customer dimension of business vulnerability, market stability and level of 
reconstruction relevance are two major determinants. These two factors both negatively 
affect the level of business vulnerability, which means that businesses with larger and 
more stable market coverage and those with services/products readily for post-disaster 
reconstruction activities are less vulnerable. Although previous research in disaster 
literature provides some empirical evidence supporting each dimension of the business 
vulnerability listed above, few studies have captured all aspects of business vulnerability. 
More research is needed to fully test the causal relations depicted in the table.  
 
 Modeling business recovery and production losses/gains 
 
One direct implication of these findings is a classification of businesses into groups 
experiencing similar levels of sales losses following a disaster. Specifically, small 
wholesale and small retail businesses are generally quite vulnerable to disasters, but 
wholesale and retail chains, as well as companies in the construction, manufacturing, and 
FIRE sectors have only moderate vulnerability. Professional services companies such as 
law firms generally have low vulnerability. However, this generalization must be 
qualified by noting a need to adjust for businesses’ variations in exposure to 
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environmental hazards within a community as well as the structural vulnerability of their 
capital assets. In the latter case, decreased structural vulnerability—generally created by 
more stringent building codes and enforcement—can substantially decrease the absolute 
level of vulnerability of a given business sector even though the rank order of the 
different sectors remains the same. For example, local building construction practices are 
significantly more stringent in the state of California than in other seismic zones (e.g., the 
New Madrid Seismic Zone; see Prater and Lindell 2000, for an example). Thus, business 
vulnerability analysis should be conducted at the community level because each 
community varies in its exposure to environmental hazards, the vulnerability of 
businesses’ capital assets, and the vulnerability of these businesses to direct and indirect 
losses. For these reasons, it is not currently possible to uniquely define the vulnerability 
of each economic sector in the North American Industry Classification System. 
This discussion of vulnerability also enables us to conceptualize changes in 
production, sales, and profits—and thus the dynamics of business recovery. In particular, 
four cases illustrate firms’ variation in their post-disaster sales levels. According to 
Figure 3, gains and losses in sales (the ordinate) over time (the abscissa) are defined by 
the area enclosed within the (vertical) disaster line, (horizontal) pre-disaster sales level, 
and (diagonal) recovery curve. Gains are represented by the size of the area above the 
pre-disaster sales level and losses are represented by the size of the area below the pre-
disaster sales level (the shaded area in each panel). The first case is defined by businesses 
in the impact area having minimal hazard vulnerability. Such businesses (e.g., 
professional services) experience only small decreases in sales after impact and return 
quickly to pre-disaster levels (Figure 3a). The second case consists of businesses that also 
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are in the impact area, but have moderate vulnerability. Such businesses (e.g., large 
manufacturers) experience larger initial drops in their sales levels so recovery takes 
longer (Figure 3b). By contrast, the third case consists of businesses that experience 
initial sales losses because they are inside (thus experiencing direct losses) or near (thus 
experiencing indirect losses) the impact area. However, they later experience an increase 
in demand for their products/services during disaster aftermath (Figure 3c). Recovery 
related businesses in the building construction, construction materials, and hospitality 
(e.g., hotels and restaurants) industries exemplify a pattern in which an initial loss (e.g., 
Figure 3a Figure 3b
Figure 3c Figure 3d
Sales
Pre-disaster sales level
TimeDisaster
0%
100%
Sales
Pre-disaster sales level
TimeDisaster
0%
100%
Sales
Pre-disaster sales level
TimeDisaster
0%
100%
TimeDisaster
Sales
Pre-disaster sales level
0%
100%
Figure 3: Patterns of business sales changes after environmental disasters
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due to minor damage or infrastructure disruption) is rapidly restored and followed by 
increased sales. The final case describes recovery related businesses just outside the 
impact area. Not only do they avoid initial losses, but they also can take advantage of 
expanded demand in the stricken community to reap gains in the disaster aftermath 
(Figure 3d).  
 
EFFECTS OF HAZARD ADJUSTMENTS ON BUSINESS VULNERABILITY 
 
 
Hazard adjustment refers to practices taken to respond to environmental threats in 
ways that reduce threats to personal safety, property, and community functioning. It is 
well documented that achievement of community emergency preparedness takes place by 
pre-impact planning, training, and exercising of four groups of activities: emergency 
assessment, expedient hazard mitigation, population protection, and incident management 
(Lindell and Perry 1992, 1996; Perry and Lindell 2003; Tierney, et al. 2001). These 
emergency preparedness principles should be similar for a business, but the contents are 
somewhat different from those for a community. Emergency assessment consist of 
actions that evaluate the potential impacts of an imminent disaster (e.g. monitoring an 
approaching hurricane), expedient hazard mitigation consists of last-minute actions to 
protect physical assets (e.g. covering inventory with plastic sheets), population protection 
aims at protecting employees from impact (e.g. stocking first aid supplies), incident 
management actions coordinate an emergency response (e.g. establishing backup 
communications). Actions in the recovery phase include inventorying and salvaging 
damaged goods, protecting undamaged property, and re-establishing contact with 
suppliers and customers (Federal Emergency Management Agency, no date). 
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Some studies examining business hazard adjustment provide only anecdotal data 
about their implementation and effectiveness. Eguchi and Munroe (1992) reported that 
before the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake, the Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) 
had a mutual aid plan with Southern California Gas (SCG) addressing emergency 
inventories, resources, and labor sharing. PG&E also engaged in regular drills involving 
recovery and restoration of services. After the Loma Prieta earthquake, with support from 
SCG, PG&E restored disrupted gas service to 50,000 homes within two weeks—four 
weeks less than the estimated duration. Alesch and Holly (1996) reported cases of mutual 
emergency coordination on purchasing and distribution among businesses that facilitated 
a quick recovery following the 1994 Northridge earthquake. Suppliers extended credit 
periods for victims, whereas customers expedited payment on invoices and, in some 
cases, even temporarily increased their purchases. In the aftermath of Hurricane Andrew, 
many corporations in Miami-Dade County mobilized resources to protect their work 
force (Sanchez, Korbin and Viscarra 1995). Businesses used emergency relief services 
such as transportation, financial assistance, housing, cleanup, and reconstruction 
materials support to facilitate employees’ rapid return to normal conditions. Businesses in 
the San Francisco Bay Area affected by the Loma Prieta earthquake introduced several 
emergency mechanisms (e.g. expanded business hours, new shipping schedules, flexible 
employee working time, temporary relocation) to minimize operational losses (Kroll et 
al. 1990). Chemical plants on Texas Gulf Coast were actively involved in county 
hurricane emergency management so they executed shutdown procedures well before the 
landfall of Hurricane Bret and resumed normal operations shortly after the hurricane 
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made landfall (Richards 1999). In summary, business hazard adjustments might take 
many different forms that depend upon the distinctive nature of their core operations.   
Research on household hazard adjustments (for review, see Drabek 1986; Lindell 
and Perry 2000) suggests that businesses engaging in preparedness and mitigation 
activities would be less vulnerable to environmental disasters, but the findings of recent 
studies on business hazard adjustment adoption are inconsistent with this expectation 
(Dahlhamer and D’Souza 1997; Dahlhamer and Reshaur 1996; Webb et al. 2000). 
Instead, these researchers found no significant relation between a business’s hazard 
adjustment and the magnitude of the impacts it experienced. To explain the discrepancy, 
they suggested that most business hazard adjustments involve employees’ life safety 
rather than continuity of business operations. Indeed, these studies used a checklist 
similar to those employed in studies of household disaster preparedness to evaluate 
business’s preparedness adoption level. Alternatively, the failure to find a significant 
relationship between hazard adjustment and business impact might arise from selective 
adoption of hazard adjustments by those at greatest risk. Specifically, it might be that 
businesses with the greatest levels of hazard adjustment were those that had the greatest 
initial level of hazard vulnerability. If this were the case, their greater level of hazard 
adjustment actions might have cancelled out their greater level of hazard vulnerability—
thus resulting in comparable levels of damage regardless of the level of hazard 
adjustment. 
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IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
 
Emergency response plans have long drawn wide support from scientists and 
practitioners as an effective way to guide the immediate response to a disaster (Dynes, 
Quarantelli and Kreps 1972; Lindell and Perry 1992; Tierney et al. 2001). A more recent 
emphasis has been the development of pre-disaster recovery plans (Comerio 1998; Geis 
1996; Mileti 1999; Schwab, Topping, Eadie, Deyle and Smith 1998; Wilson 1991). Such 
plans have been found to be effective in accelerating community recovery and integrating 
mitigation measures into the reconstruction process (Spangle Associates and Robert 
Olson Associates 1997; Wu and Lindell 2004). However, most policy initiatives in these 
discussions have been directed toward household recovery (e.g. sheltering and housing), 
so business recovery has been neglected. Nonetheless, economic development and 
employment are major issues in the local political agenda, so local government needs to 
take steps before and after a disaster to protect its economic base by enhancing local 
businesses’ capability to cope with disaster impacts. 
Because businesses vary significantly in their vulnerability to disaster impacts, local 
planners need to work with the businesses in their own communities (Federal Emergency 
Management Agency 1997, no date). This vulnerability assessment should identify 
businesses that are located in hazard-prone areas, assess their structural vulnerability, and 
evaluate their needs for emergency response and disaster recovery after different types 
(hurricanes, earthquakes, floods) and intensities of environmental disasters. Local 
jurisdictions should use the information in the vulnerability assessment to revise their 
emergency response (Federal Emergency Management Agency 1996) and disaster 
recovery (Schwab et al. 1998) plans to meet the needs of local businesses. Changes in 
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these emergency response and disaster recovery plans could have important effects on 
business recovery because local agencies can establish temporary locations for displaced 
businesses in the immediate aftermath (Durkin 1984), restore disrupted road network and 
lifeline service in a timely manner (Kroll et al. 1990; Alesch and Holly 1996), expedite 
building inspection and permit issuing (Kroll et al. 1990), and protect local businesses, 
especially small firms from the sudden influx of legitimate and “fly-by-night” 
competitors into the community (Alesch et al. 2001). 
This vulnerability assessment can be accomplished through collaboration between 
community economic development planners and emergency managers. Such cooperation 
is important because it fulfills statutory obligations of both parties. Economic planners 
benefit from the hazard analyses conducted by emergency managers which, in turn, will 
enrich the emerging practice of community economic development contingency planning 
(Blakely and Bradshaw 2002; Bergman 1981). Conversely, emergency managers can 
save time and effort by obtaining detailed information directly from economic 
development planners about the community’s economic base—including an inventory of 
businesses, their employment levels, and linkages among industries. 
In addition, procedures for providing congregate care for displaced households can 
be readily adapted to accommodate displaced small businesses. For example, Durkin 
(1984) reported many displaced retail outlets were directed into a local college 
gymnasium. These businesses were able to operate from temporary booths for about one 
month until alternative accommodations were available. Procedures that have been 
incorporated into a community’s pre-impact recovery plan, such as monitoring 
contractors and retail prices (Wu and Lindell 2004) can also be extended to facilitate 
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local business recovery. For example, local construction companies can be given a head 
start by allowing them to register for post-disaster reconstruction before a disaster strikes. 
Moreover, government contracts for infrastructure restoration can give bonus points to 
those contractors that utilize local firms. To alleviate the discounted price of construction 
materials that undercuts the sales of local firms (Alesch et al. 2001), local jurisdictions 
can promote the establishment of pre-impact group marketing that facilitates pre-disaster 
ties between local businesses and prospective customers (Blakely and Bradshaw 2002). 
Local government involvement in such marketing efforts is especially important for small 
businesses because they generally lack adequate resources for advertising. Businesses can 
avoid this vulnerability by adopting “just in time” manufacturing but adoption of this 
strategy can shift vulnerability to telecommunication (for placing orders for new 
materials and receiving orders for completed products) and transportation (for delivering 
raw materials and finished products) networks. 
Local government can also organize assistance from other businesses to ameliorate 
the impacts of a disaster by shortening the time that victimized firms take to return to 
normal operations. Support from the business community can include emergency labor 
support (Eguchi and Munroe 1992), extended credit from suppliers, accelerated payments 
for products and services, and above normal levels of purchases made by regular 
customers (Alesch and Holly 1996). Such arrangements by local planners are sorely 
needed because federal programs such as SBA loans and Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) recovery programs are often ineffective in facilitating 
business recovery following environmental disasters (Alesch and Holly 1996; Alesch et 
al. 2001; Durkin 1984; Kroll et al. 1990; Tierney 1997b). The most frequently cited 
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reasons include a slow application process and demanding loan requirements. Local 
governments in disaster impact areas can take actions to establish and maintain closer ties 
with these federal agencies so arrangements on the locations of program offices, 
streamlined loan application processes, and local staffing/resource support can be 
implemented to improve the accessibility of these programs immediately after disaster 
impact. Indeed, this vertical integration with higher-level government agencies will 
facilitate the recovery of both households and businesses (Berke 1995; Berke, Kartz and 
Wenger 1993).  
In particular, the emergency response and disaster recovery needs of small 
businesses deserve special attention from local officials, because they are more 
vulnerable to disaster impacts than their larger counterparts. This is particularly 
unfortunate because small business is a crucial contributor to community employment 
and local government revenue generation. Indeed, small business development has been a 
long-standing revitalization strategy utilized by local economic development planners 
and community development corporations, especially in socio-economically distressed 
neighborhoods (Blakely and Bradshaw 2002; Porter 1997). Disaster research has 
repeatedly shown that these neighborhoods are disproportionately vulnerable to 
environmental disasters and experience more difficulties in returning to normalcy after an 
event (Bates and Peacock 1993; Blaikie, Cannon, Davis and Wisner 1994; Bolin and 
Stanford 1998; Comerio 1998; Peacock and Girard 1997). For these reasons, it is very 
likely that policy initiatives facilitating small businesses emergency response and disaster 
recovery will gain support from different local government agencies, non-government 
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organizations and residents—an important condition for successful formulation and 
implementation of hazard mitigation policies (Prater and Lindell 2000).  
In addition to developing policies that help businesses after disasters, local 
government agencies need to encourage businesses to engage in more effective hazard 
management before disasters strike. However, disaster research has revealed relatively 
low levels of hazard adjustment adoption, so community hazard awareness programs 
need to be carefully examined before targeting local businesses. Current research and 
local practices of risk communication are disproportionately oriented toward households 
(Lindell and Perry 2004), but business owners and managers also need to be informed of 
threatening environmental hazards and alternative hazard adjustments. Many 
corporations have begun to integrate environmental issues into their strategic plans 
(Douglas and Judge 1995; Makower 1993; Newman and Breeden 1992; Stead and Stead 
1992; Taylor 1992), but their primary focus has been the reduction of environmental 
pollution and resource depletion—not the reduction of vulnerability to environmental 
disasters. There are clear indications that businesses fail to protect their capital assets 
before disasters occur because they do not know what can be done (Alesch and Holly 
1996).  
The discussion presented in this paper only begins to illustrate the uniqueness of 
businesses’ adjustments to environmental hazards. Future research is needed to identify 
which hazard adjustments are suitable for businesses in general, and which are suitable 
only for businesses of a particular size or in a particular economic sector. In addition, 
future research is needed to examine the ways in which local planners and emergency 
managers can more successfully construct hazard messages, select appropriate 
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communications channels, and select message source—all of which are all critical 
components for an effective hazard awareness program (Lindell and Perry 2004). 
Furthermore, research is needed to identify other policy tools, such as incentives and 
sanctions, that can effectively induce businesses to adopt hazard adjustments.  
One challenge for business disaster preparedness is that investments in hazard 
mitigation and emergency decrease short-term profitability. For example, employee 
losses can be avoided by cross training, but this requires an initial investment and might 
also require refresher training if the alternative tasks are complex. Overstaffing is another 
strategy to ensure continued labor availability, but this also produces continuing costs. 
Contracts for outsourcing can limit the routine costs, but the effectiveness of this strategy 
after a disaster might depend upon the survival of the telecommunications and 
transportation networks. Thus, further research is needed to identify additional hazard 
adjustments and increase the effectiveness and reduce the costs of existing adjustments. 
Several other research questions raised by the business impacts and vulnerability analysis 
include the more detailed qualitative description and quantitative measure of households’ 
consumption changes before and after a natural disaster and the impact of population 
dislocation on the viability of businesses in disaster impact areas.  
Because this is a preliminary model, further research is needed to provide a closer 
examination of the emergency response and disaster recovery demands of different 
business sectors in communities with different natural hazard threats, various impact 
intensities, and different socioeconomic and socio-demographic settings. Also needed is a 
more detailed understanding of the ways in which local jurisdictions can facilitate 
businesses’ emergency response and disaster recovery. The business impacts model, 
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which shows how businesses impacts can result from input disruption (e.g. 
building/equipment damage, inventory damage, infrastructure failure, and workforce 
losses) and output disruption (e.g. customer loss, demand shifts) can serve as a starting 
point for research along this line. 
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